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Abstract
Using a simple analytical model incorporating benefits of a stock, costs of adjusting the stock, and
uncertainty in costs, we uncover several important principles governing the choice of price-based policies
(e.g., taxes) relative to quantity-based policies (e.g., tradable permits) for controlling stock externalities.
Applied to the problem of greenhouse gases and climate change, we find that a price-based instrument
generates several times the expected net benefits of a quantity instrument. As in Weitzman (1974), the
relative slopes of the marginal benefits and costs of controlling the externality continue to be critical
determinants of the efficiency of prices relative to quantities, with flatter marginal benefits and steeper
marginal costs favoring prices.  But some important adjustments for dynamic effects are necessary,
including correlation of cost shocks across time, discounting, stock decay, and the rate of benefits growth.
We also demonstrate an important link between instrument choice and policy stringency, based on the
observation that both of these elements of policy design depend on the same underlying information,
namely the marginal benefit and cost slopes.  This result is especially useful when there is disagreement
about benefits, since it can be used to restrict the set of efficient policies even in such cases.  For negative
externalities, we find that less stringent controls and price instruments are both associated with flatter
marginal benefits, while aggressive controls and quantity instruments are associated with steeper marginal
benefits.  Intuitively, damages (marginal benefits) can only be steep enough to recommend quantity
controls in the near term if they are steep enough to recommend substantial reductions.  Furthermore, as
long as the existing stock is large relative to the annual flow, marginal benefits either (i) will appear very
flat over range of emissions in a single year, or (ii) will be sufficiently high to warrant near complete
abatement.  This generic characteristic of what it means to be a stock externality therefore weighs heavily
in favor of price instruments for their control, so long as the optimal control falls short of stabilization at
the current stock level.
In the case of greenhouse gas policy, we show that any benefit slope consistent with quantity controls
would imply an optimal emission level of zero.  Under more general conditions we further demonstrate
that price instruments are preferred in cases where optimal abatement rates are below about 40 percent,
unless the initial stock level is small (less than twenty times the flow rate) or benefits and costs diverge
quickly (by more than 10 percent annually).  This result has important implications for the Kyoto
Protocol, which mandates reductions among industrialized countries equal to roughly 5 percent of
forecast global emissions.  Regardless of one’s beliefs about various climate change parameters, these
relatively low aggregate abatement levels are inconsistent with quantity-based emission limits.
Key words: Stock, Externality, Regulation, Policy, Uncertainty, Price, Quantity, Tax, Tradable Permit,
Pollution, Climate Change, Greenhouse Gas, Instrument Choice
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Regulating Stock Externalities Under Uncertainty
Richard G. Newell and William A. Pizer
*
I. Introduction
The threat of global climate change is one of the most important and challenging problems
currently facing the human race.  Without a concerted international effort to reduce manmade emissions
of heat-trapping greenhouse gases in the coming decades, the world could face climatic changes with
potentially profound impacts on the global population and economy. Global climate change is a stock
externality: the consequences depend not on the emissions of greenhouse gases in a single year, but on the
accumulated stock of emissions over many decades.  In fact, many of today’s most pressing policy
concerns—from hazardous waste to research, development, and educational attainment—are
characterized by stock-based externalities.
When contemplating regulation of these problems, policymakers face the inevitable and
important task of not just setting a target for policy, but also of choosing a policy instrument for attaining
that target.   The Kyoto Protocol and Framework Convention on Climate Change, for example, consider
restrictions on the annual flow of greenhouse gases linked to global warming, with the ultimate goal of
limiting the atmospheric stock of greenhouse gases.  In such policy settings, this paper offers guidance on
the best instrument for regulating stocks when the costs of regulation are uncertain.  The primary focus is
negative externalities—pollutants such as carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, hazardous waste,
pesticides in groundwater, and ozone depleting substances.  They are produced continually as a byproduct
of economic activity, but—unlike other pollutants such as airborne particulate matter or volatile organic
compounds—their harmful consequences are a function of a much larger stock accumulating in the
environment, rather than an annual flow.  The common element among these pollutants is that they persist
for a long period of time.  Examples of positive externalities include policies designed to protect wildlife
habitats and preserve species, as well as provision of durable public goods, such as highways and national
defense technologies.
Regulating such stocks involves considerable uncertainty.  The magnitude of the associated
benefits and costs of control are often known only approximately, while increases to the stock in any
single year can persist far into the future, introducing additional uncertainty about conditions and
valuation in those future periods.  Even as regulated firms learn about costs and respond to an announced
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price or quantity policy, the ability of regulators to ascertain and use this information is limited.  Policy
adjustments introduce incentives to behave strategically and realistic policy choices often involve only
simple and infrequently adjustable controls.
1
Economic analyses of climate change policy have thus far developed the clearest intuition about
instrument choice in a stock setting, but this has not generally been a focus of that research.  Nordhaus
(1994a) observes that damages in his climate change policy simulations are essentially a linear function of
emissions and, based on an appeal to Weitzman (1974), that this implies a preference for price
instruments.  He also suggests that this preference might extend to stock pollutants more generally.  Pizer
(1997), on the other hand, directly investigates the price versus quantity question for climate change using
Monte Carlo simulations.  Like Nordhaus and Kolstad (1996), he observes linear damages, but is further
able to demonstrate that price policies indeed lead to much better welfare outcomes.  Finally, McKibbin
and Wilcoxen (1997) argue that the absence of an obvious benefit to stabilizing either the flow or stock
weighs heavily in favor of a price mechanism.  None of these authors, however, clearly examines the link
between the flatness of marginal benefits and issues of policy choice, or explain the conditions under
which their observed results and conjectures will continue to hold.  That is our goal: to develop a simple
analytical model of policy choice for stock externality regulation and to apply the resulting framework to
the important issue of greenhouse gas policy.
A. Policy Choice Under Uncertainty
In a deterministic world, it is widely recognized that regulation based on either prices (e.g., taxes
or subsidies) or quantities (e.g., tradeable permits) can yield any desired level of output, including the
economically efficient outcome.  Although state-contingent policies could, in principle, be designed to
maintain this proposition even under conditions of uncertainty, such policies would be of little if any
practical use.  Recognizing this, Weitzman (1974) initiated a discussion about the relative efficiency of
alternative regulatory instruments in a distinctly different world characterized by uncertainty, asymmetry
of information, second-best policy alternatives, and costly policy adjustments.  Under these more realistic
conditions, Weitzman found that there are fundamental differences in the consequences of price versus
quantity regulation.  He described the resulting divergence in efficiency as a function of fairly basic and
intuitive economic variables, including the slopes of marginal benefits and costs and the degree of cost
uncertainty.
                                                
1 Laffont (1977) provides a careful description of the information structure assumed in policy choice problems
formulated in the Weitzman tradition. Iterative policy processes with truth-revealing procedures could, in principle,
be designed to yield first-best outcomes even in the face of uncertainty and information asymmetries (Kwerel 1977;
Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin 1980).Resources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
3
When uncertainty exists about costs, and policies must be fixed before the uncertainty is resolved,
priced-based policies will lead to distinctly different outcomes than quantity-based policies.  Pollution
taxes, for example, operate by encouraging firms to reduce emissions as long as the marginal cost of
reducing an additional unit of pollution is less than the level of the pollution tax.  The tax mechanism will
lead to a range of possible emission levels across different cost outcomes—but will fix marginal cost at
the level of the tax.  Conversely, a quantity-based policy such as a tradable permit system will fix the total
volume of emissions, with the equilibrium permit price determined by the marginal cost of the last
reduction necessary to meet the emission constraint.  The permit mechanism will therefore lead to a range
of possible permit prices (and marginal costs) across different cost outcomes—but will lead to a fixed
level of aggregate emissions.  Different expected net benefits will therefore be associated with these
alternate policies.
Weitzman’s remarkable insight was that, on economic efficiency grounds, a flat expected
marginal benefit function (relative to marginal costs) favors prices, while a steep benefit function favors
quantities.   Intuitively, relatively flat marginal benefits imply a constant benefit per unit, suggesting that
a tax could perfectly correct the externality.  In contrast, steep marginal benefits imply a dangerous
threshold that should be avoided at all costs—a threshold that is efficiently enforced by a quantity control.
Despite its substantial insight, however, the Weitzman result remains a static story.  Additional modeling
is necessary as we turn to the specific question of controlling stock externalities, where consequences
occur in a dynamic setting.
B. Stock Regulation Under Uncertainty
Research on optimal policy choice under uncertainty has generally dealt with situations where
both benefits and costs are a function only of current output, as in Weitzman’s original formulation.
2
Those that have explored the question in a dynamic context have generally done so in elaborate models
where the general theory of stock externality regulation was not the object.  In contrast, we use an
otherwise simplified model to explore how uncertainty could influence the choice of policies to regulate a
periodic flow when benefits are a function of the accumulated stock.  Our results add several important
                                                
2 Most economic research on stock pollutants has focused on optimal control in a deterministic setting (Keeler,
Spence, and Zeckhauser 1971; Plourde 1972; Smith 1972; Kitabatake 1989; Falk and Mendlesohn 1993).  This
removes the distinction among alternative instruments and sidesteps the issue of choosing an efficient instrument.
Plourde and Yeung (1989) extend these models to incorporate stochastic elements, but they only consider
uncertainty in the amount of pollution generated and the stock decay rate, that is, on the benefit side.  Without cost
uncertainty, price and quantity controls remain “equivalent”.  Research on efficient fisheries management has
addressed the issue in a context where benefits and costs are a function of the stock of fish, via the harvesting
function (Koenig 1984a, 1984b; Anderson 1986; Androkovich and Stollery 1991).  However, parsimonious,
intuitive results regarding efficient policy for controlling other types of stocks are obscured in the analyses by the
particulars of optimal fishery modeling.  In isolation from our own work, Hoel and Karp (1998) have recently
written about regulating a stock pollutant under uncertainty, with a focus on the frequency of adjustment of firms
and policy to new information.  Otherwise, see Stavins (1996) for a review of the literature on efficient policy
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new dimensions to the existing view of the problem, with potential relevance to a wide variety of
problems where policy interventions might be justified based on the existence of positive or negative
stock externalities.
Using a simple analytical model incorporating benefits of a stock, costs of adjusting the stock,
and uncertainty in costs, we uncover several important principles governing the choice of prices relative
to quantities for controlling stock externalities.  As in Weitzman (1974), the relative slopes of the
marginal benefits and costs of controlling the externality continue to be critical determinants of the
efficiency of prices relative to quantities, with flatter marginal benefits and steeper marginal costs
favoring prices.  But some important adjustments for dynamic effects are necessary, including correlation
of cost shocks across time, discounting, stock decay, and the rate of benefits growth.  Applied to the
problem of greenhouse gas reductions to mitigate the effects of climate change, we find a price advantage
of almost five times the welfare gain associated with quantity-based controls.
But we can say more, especially when one considers the disagreement surrounding the benefits of
climate change mitigation.  Holding other parameters constant, we show that flatter benefits not only
favor price policies, but also lead to lower abatement levels.  We then characterize exactly how low the
optimal abatement level must be before it reveals underlying benefits that recommend price policies.  In
our climate example, we find that optimal abatement levels even marginally below 100 percent are
sufficient to recommend price policies.  More importantly, we demonstrate optimal emission reductions
of less than about 40 percent are sufficient to reveal a general preference for price policies, unless the
stock is particularly small or there is a rapid divergence between benefits and costs over time.  Returning
to the question of optimal climate change policy, we argue that the 5 percent aggregate reductions
mandated by the Kyoto Protocol are inconsistent with quantity-based regulation regardless of
parameterization.
In section 2, we present our model of stock externality regulation under uncertainty and describe
the optimal quantity and price policies.  Section 3 derives an expression for the difference in the expected
net benefits of price versus quantity policies and applies the result to the problem of global climate
change.  Section 4 develops the connection between the optimal control path and instrument choice and
again considers the climate change example.  Details of the data used in the climate change example as
well as detailed analytical derivations are left to the appendix.
II. A Model of Stock Externality Regulation Under Uncertainty
In developing a model to explore issues of policy instrument choice for stock externality
regulation, we were guided by three goals: (i) to keep the model parsimonious, (ii) to follow previous
convention where possible, and (iii) to nonetheless include elements that are essential for the application
to greenhouse gas policy.  For these reasons, we chose to specify quadratic costs and benefits in theResources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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manner of Weitzman (1974),
3 and to focus on basic price and quantity policies.  The focus on these
policies is appealing not only for its simplicity, but also due to the infeasibility and costliness of complex
policies that entail continual readjustment or large amounts of information.  It is possible of course to
combine price and quantity mechanisms to form superior hybrid policies (Roberts and Spence 1976,
Weitzman 1978), but these are rarely, if ever, seen in practice.  Without loss of generality, we also use a
discrete time framework, which is both more consistent with realistic policy design and avoids the use of
stochastic calculus.
This approach allows us to compare and contrast our results for stock externalities with
Weitzman’s well-known results that are applicable to a single-period flow externality.  To examine stock
externalities, we make several modifications to his original framework, including omission of certain
complicating features that turn out to be irrelevant for the final results.
4  First, in our model benefits are a
function of the stock and costs are a function of the flow, whereas in Weitzman’s model both costs and
benefits were a function of the flow.  Next, because changes in the stock level persist across time, it is
necessary to set the model in a multi-period context.  This dynamic context has several key features: stock
depreciation, time discounting, cost correlation, and growth in baseline conditions, benefits, and costs.
With benefits and costs occurring at different points in time, intertemporal prices, or discount
factors, are required.  The persistence of stocks and the possibility of stock decay introduces a
depreciation rate.  In addition, just as the results in the static analysis can depend on the correlation of
benefit and cost uncertainty within the single period (Weitzman 1974, Stavins 1996), in a multi-period
setting results will also hinge on correlation among costs in different periods.  This correlation represents
persistence in shocks to technology and baseline emissions, and would typically be positive—especially
over annual intervals where business cycles and other macroeconomic shocks clearly persist.  This feature
is also essential in order for the discrete approach to match results in continuous time since the cost
shocks will be increasingly and positively correlated over smaller and smaller intervals.
Finally, in order to properly apply the model to longer term problems such as the regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions, we need to allow for growth or decline in benefits, costs, and uncontrolled
output due to changes over time in important factors such as income, population, and technology.
                                                
3 Weitzman (1974) described quadratic costs and benefits as local approximations around the optimal quantity
control which only needed to prevail over the range of likely disturbances in order for the results to be valid.  In our
model, since both the stock and flow change over time, we focus on globally quadratic costs and benefits.  The
results can be generalized to a path of quadratic cost-benefit approximations.
4 First, we omit uncertainty in the base level of costs and benefits (i.e., the constant terms in the cost and benefit
functions) because Weitzman shows that it has no effect on the relative advantage of alternative policies.  We also
omit benefit uncertainty because it does not affect the behavior of firms or individuals in response to a policy and
therefore cannot affect the relative advantage of alternative policies unless it is correlated with costs.  Weitzman
(1974) and Stavins (1996) have explored the potential importance of such benefit-cost correlation in detail.  We
suspect that including correlation in costs and benefits in our model would have implications similar to those found
in Weitzman’s original analysis, namely that positive correlation in benefits and costs will tend to favor quantity
controls; the exact form of the consequences remains an issue for further research.Resources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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Uncontrolled output (of a negative externality) is likely to increase over time due to economic growth.
Benefits also seem likely to increase due to growth in population and per capita income.  Technological
change may, however, mitigate growth in baseline output and benefits.  In the climate change context, for
example, energy efficiency improvements can counter the effect of economic growth on greenhouse gas
emissions and adaptation can reduce the damages resulting from climate change.  Technological change
will also tend to reduce per unit production (abatement) costs, although increased scarcity in important
inputs could counter these cost reductions.
A. Benefits, Costs, and Stock Accumulation







BS S S =− − ,
where t indexes time,  t S  is the stock of the regulated good,  t S  is the benefit-maximizing stock, and  t b  is
the per-period slope of marginal benefits—all of which can change over time.  We assume benefits are
concave ( 0 t b ≥ ), so that benefits are maximized at  t S  and there are diminishing returns, regardless of
whether we are seeking to increase the stock (for a good) or decrease it (for a bad).  While changes in  t b
over time allow for benefit growth, changes in  t S  could be associated with adjustments in the desired
level of a good due to economic growth.  In the case of a negative externality like pollution, we assume
the benefit maximizing level is zero, after normalizing if there is some positive natural level of the stock
(as in the case of atmospheric carbon).  To eliminate unnecessary complexity, we also omit the constant
term from the quadratic form since it has no effect on the results; the linear term vanishes when the form
is written in terms of deviations from the maximizing level.  We apply similar simplifications below with
costs.






t t t t tt tt
c
Cq q q q q θθ =− +− ,
where  t q  is the quantity of the regulated good (or bad) produced,  t q  is the cost-minimizing output of the
good in the absence of regulation,  t c  is the slope of marginal costs, and  t θ  is a shock to the marginal cost
function.
5  Potential changes in  t c  and  t q  allow for cost reductions and growth in uncontrolled output.
                                                
5 Despite its intuitive and analytical attraction, there is admittedly an asymmetry in our description of costs and
benefits since one could imagine stock effects on the cost side, representing either knowledge or capital.  While this
remains an interesting area for further research, our intuition is that such an effect would favor price controls.
Namely, if costs depend on both the regulated flow as well as a secondary (capital and/or knowledge) stock that is
fixed in the short run, it will become increasingly expensive to make large, positive changes to the regulated flow in
the short run.  This would show up in our model as convexity in the marginal cost schedule and, as suggested byResources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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The cost shock  t θ  has an autoregressive form  1 tt t θ ρ θε − =+ , with correlation  ρ  across time, and error
t ε  with zero mean and variance 
2


















assuming that  1 0 t θ < = .  Reduction of a negative externality, for example, is therefore represented by
tt qq < .  We assume costs are convex ( 0 t c > ) so that costs are minimized at  t q  (ignoring the potential
benefits).  Any deviation from this rate, whether to increase output in the case of a good or decrease it in
the case of a bad, leads to increasing costs at an increasing rate.
We represent the dynamic nature of the stock by an accumulation equation,
(3) 1 (1 ) tt t SS q δ − =− + ,
which specifies that the stock decays at rate 01 δ ≤≤  in addition to the contribution of  t q .  The
depreciation rate can take on values representing cases ranging from a “pure stock externality” that
persists forever ( 0 δ = ) to a “flow externality” ( 1 δ = ) that replicates the traditionally analyzed case.
B. Optimal Quantity and Price Policies
We first determine the conditions under which a quantity policy for period t will maximize
















Next we consider the optimal price policy.  We then derive the relative advantage of price versus quantity
policies as the difference in their expected net benefits, and comment on how relative policy performance
is influenced by the shape of the cost and benefit functions, discount and decay rates, and cost correlation.
We determine the optimal quantity policy at time t by maximizing the expected net benefits of
stock control (Equation (4)) with respect to  t q , subject to the stock accumulation relationship given in
Equation (3).  The Lagrangian form of this optimization problem is
(5) () 1 () ( 1 )
max E  ( , )
(1 ) t
ss s s s s
ttt st q
st











+   ∑ ,
where E[] ⋅  is the expectations operator.  This yields two first order conditions in addition to the stock
constraint:
(6) ()
** E[ ( , )] 0 ttt t t t t t Cq cq q θλ λ ′ −+ = − − + =
                                                                                                                                                            






E [() ] 0
11
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where Equation (7) holds for all st ≥ , and 
*
t q  and 
*
t S  are the optimal quantity control and resulting
stock level, respectively.  Note that Equation (7) can be recursively substituted and then combined with
Equation (6) to yield
(8)
** (1 )












 −  ′′ =   +  ∑ .
That is, the expected sum of discounted and depreciated marginal benefits associated with the output
quantity in a particular period should equal the expected marginal cost.
Now consider price-based mechanisms.  Since costs and benefits depend on  t q  and  t S , the first
step in calculating the optimal price policy is to determine the quantity that would result from a particular
price policy.  This response function  () , tt t qP θ  depends on both the price  t P set by the regulator and the
cost shock  t θ .  The price policy will take the form of a subsidy in the case of a positive externality and a
tax in the case of a negative externality.  Assuming firms respond to the price policy  t P by equating it to












To compute the optimal price policy 
*
t P , we employ the Lagrangian given by Equation (5) with
two changes: (i) the choice variable is now  t P, rather than  t q ; and (ii) we substitute the response function
(Equation (9)) for  t q .  The resulting first order conditions are
() () () () ()
* E( , ) E [ ] 10 ttt t tt t t t t t Cq qP c q q c θλ λ  ′′ −+ = − − += 
() 11
11
E [() ] E [] 0
11




−− ′ −+ = − − −+ =
++
.
Since  1 () tt t qP c ′ =  is a constant (see Equation (9)), this term will drop out of the first condition and yield
the same first order conditions for the optimal price policy as for the optimal quantity policy, in
expectation.  Thus, the optimal price policy 
*
t P  must result in the optimal quantity policy 
*
t q  on average
(that is,  ()
** E, ttt t qP q θ  =  ), and thus follows  ()
**
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where  tt c θ −  is the quantity deviation resulting from the cost shock in period t.  In other words, the
optimal price policy delivers the optimal quantity level “on average”, but delivers more or less than the
quantity policy as marginal costs fall and rise, respectively, thereby taking advantage of low costs and
avoiding high costs.
As a consequence of deviations in the quantities induced by the price policy, the stock level















=− − ∑ ,
where 
*
t S  is the stock associated with the optimal quantity policy.  Since differences in the costs and
benefits of alternative policies depend only on differences in the flows and stocks associated with those
policies, Equations (10) and (11) set the stage for deriving the relative advantage of prices versus
quantities.
III. The Relative Advantage of Price Over Quantity Policies
Our basic metric for policy comparisons builds on Weitzman’s method of computing the
“comparative advantage” of price instruments over quantity instruments.  This approach involves deriving
and comparing the expected benefits and costs of alternative policies.
6  In particular, we compute the
difference  t ∆  in the expected net benefits of using a price rather than quantity policy in period t as
follows:
(12) () () , price , quantity , price , quantity , price , quantity EE tt t t t t t NB NB B B C C   ∆= − = − − −   .
Thus,  0 t ∆>  indicates that the optimal price-based policy performs better than the optimal quantity-based
policy in period t, while  0 t ∆<  indicates the reverse.  Both derivation and intuition are easier if we first
derive the difference in the expected costs of prices versus quantities, then derive the difference in
expected benefits, and finally find  t ∆  by taking the difference of these two differences (as shown in
Equation (12)).
A. Cost Savings from Price Policy
The expected difference in costs each period is given by
                                                
6 The discussions of the cost and benefit differences hinge only on the price policy having the same expected
quantity outcome as the quantity policy (and similarly, the quantity policy having the same expected price outcome
as the price policy).  Under those conditions, the expressions for the cost and benefit differences are equally





, price , quantity
2





tt t t t t t t
t
tt t t
t t t t t t tt tt
tt
CC C q C q c
cc






 −=− −      
     =− − + − − − − + −       
,
where  tt c θ −  is again the quantity deviation resulting from the use of a price policy in period t.  Many
terms cancel or drop out upon taking expectations, yielding
(13)
22








θθ σ  
 −= − = − − = −   
 
.
The cost difference expression is negative, indicating that the price policy leads to lower expected costs
than the quantity policy.  The price policy relaxes the quantity when costs are high and increases it when
costs are low, resulting in lower average costs.  The expected savings will depend on the magnitude of
cost uncertainty and the slope of marginal costs.  The expression also reveals the interesting result that the
difference in costs depends only on the deviations of the price from the quantity policy, and not the level
of the optimal quantity policy itself.
B. Benefit Losses from Price Policy
The expected difference in benefits also depends on the quantity deviations resulting from the
price policy, but in a somewhat more complicated fashion since benefits are a function of the stock.  In
particular, use of a price policy in period t affects not only the stock in period t, but in every future period
tu + .  To properly account for these effects, we introduce notation representing the benefits in period
tu + of alternative policies in period t,  , policy
tu
t B
+ , where “policy” is either price or quantity.  The entire




+ terms.    We therefore proceed by first specifying the difference in the benefits of period t policies
in future periods tu + , then taking expectations of this difference, and finally summing up the effects in
all periods to find the total benefit difference for policy in period t,  , price , quantity E tt BB  −  .
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where this difference measures the benefits of a price policy in all periods up to and including t, versus
the benefits of a quantity policy in period t coupled with price policies in all periods up to  1 t − .  This
measures the incremental effect of a prices in the last period t, and thus avoids double counting when we
later compute the accumulated effect of price policies in every period up to t.
Taking expectations over our expression for the effect of period t policy in period tu + , many
terms cancel or drop out, yielding
()
2
, price , quantity 1 E 1 var 2(1 )cov ,
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by replacing the covariance term by a correlation factor  ,t ρ Ω , where
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Ω= + − − 

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Based on Equation (11) for St–1, we see that  ,t ρ Ω  will be non-negative as long as correlation (i.e., the
covariance term) is positive.  Further,  ,t ρ Ω  disappears ( , 1 t ρ Ω= ) if correlation is zero or if decay is
immediate ( 1 δ = ).  More generally, greater correlation or slower depreciation will increase the
covariance term, thereby increasing the magnitude of  ,t ρ Ω  (as shown in part A of the appendix).
In order to measure the entire stream of expected benefit differences associated with a price
policy in period t, we add up the discounted effects in all future periods tu + ,
(15)
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assuming that the benefit parameter  t b  grows at the constant rate  b g .  The loss generated in any
particular period depreciates in the future and, since the loss depends on the squared deviation, the factor
2 (1 ) δ −  appears alongside the discount rate in the expression.  Lower decay, lower discount rates, and
higher rates of benefit growth will increase the magnitude of  δ Ω .  Note that  1 δ Ω=  and drops out for the
case of a flow externality that decays immediately (i.e.,  1 δ = ).  If  0 δ =  and  0 b g = —corresponding to a
pure stock externality with no benefits growth—then  (1 ) / rr δ Ω= + , the present value factor for an
infinite series.
Equation (15) is unambiguously negative, indicating that the price policy leads to lower benefits,
thereby creating a policy tradeoff between saved costs and lost benefits.  Variation in  t q  leads to lower
expected benefits from the price policy because benefits are concave (the quantity policy, in contrast,
fixes  t q ).  The factor  δ Ω  augments  t b  to take account of the persistence of benefits over time, including
adjustment for decay and discounting.  When there is positive correlation in the cost shocks ( 0 ρ > ), the
expected loss of benefits rises, as indicated by the correlation term  ,t ρ Ω  multiplying  t b  in Equation (15).
With positive correlation, deviations tend to build on each other, rather than canceling out.
C. The Relative Advantage of Prices
By subtracting the cost savings (Equation (13)) from the benefit losses (Equation (15)), we find











∆= − ΩΩ .
Prices are therefore preferred ( 0 t ∆> ) if  , tt t cb δ ρ >Ω Ω , quantities are preferred ( 0 t ∆< ) if
, tt t cb δ ρ <Ω Ω , and there is indifference between prices and quantities ( 0 t ∆= ) if  , tt t cb δ ρ =Ω Ω .  Our first
observation is readily evident.
More steeply sloped marginal costs tend to favor price controls, while more steeply sloped
marginal benefits tend to favor quantity controls for regulating stock externalities.
This observation reaffirms Weitzman’s original result—the relative slopes of marginal costs and benefits
continue to be fundamental to policy choice in the dynamic context of a stock externality.  Quantities
tend to be preferred in cases where strong nonlinearities or thresholds lead to steep marginal benefits.
Less curvature in benefits tends to favor prices.Resources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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σ ∆= − .  First,
note that the sign of Weitzman’s ∆ , which indicates the policy preference, depends only on the relative
magnitude of c and b (i.e., the relative slopes).  In contrast, the sign of Equation (17) depends on the
magnitude of  t c  relative to  t b  multiplied by the persistence and correlation terms.  This is necessary
because the production costs in a given period occur only in that period while the associated benefits
persist into the indefinite future.  As described above, the persistence term  δ Ω  captures the effect of
benefit growth, stock decay, and discounting on marginal benefits, while the correlation term  ,t ρ Ω  adjusts
for the presence of cost correlation.  Faster benefit growth, lower decay rates, lower discount rates, or
greater cost correlation will increase the magnitude of  ,t δ ρ ΩΩ , thereby increasing the possibility that
quantities are preferred.  In the absence of persistence—the special case of a flow externality—these two
terms drop out and our expression reduces to Weitzman’s formula.  We therefore make two additional
observations:
Lower stock decay rates, lower discount rates, and greater rates of benefits growth tend to favor
quantity controls for regulating stock externalities.
and
Greater correlation in costs across time tends to favor quantity controls.
Under a price policy, slower stock decay causes price-induced deviations in the stock level to
persist longer, thereby increasing the variability of the stock.  This leads to lower expected benefits
because benefits are a concave function of the stock level.  Lower discount rates and greater rates of
benefits growth will give these future losses greater weight.  Depending on the rates of time discounting
and benefit growth, this “persistence effect” has the potential to greatly increase the relative importance of
marginal benefits.  In particular, regardless of how  t b  and  t c  compare, if we care enough about the future
(e.g., r near zero) it is always possible that  , tt t cb δ ρ <Ω Ω , implying a preference for quantity controls.  In
the climate change policy debate, for example, this is one possible explanation for the persistent emphasis
on quantity controls by some.  When costs are positively correlated across time, deviations in the stock
arising under a price mechanism tend to accumulate rather than canceling out.  This exacerbates variation
in the stock level and again lowers expected benefits under a price policy.
Note that our use of the words “tend to favor” is meant in a comparative static sense.  It is not
necessarily the case that low discount rates, low decay rates, highly correlated costs, or steep marginal
benefits imply that quantities are preferred, but rather that movements of the parameters in the stated
direction will widen the range of conditions in which quantities are preferred.Resources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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D. Instrument Choice Over Time
It is apparent that the relative advantage expression (Equation (17)) can change over time due to
changes in ct and bt, and due to accumulated correlation among cost shocks.  As a consequence, it will not
always be optimal to use the same instrument in every period—it may be optimal to use price policies in
some periods and quantity policies in others.  In particular, it is reasonable to assume that costs decline
over time (gc < 0) due to technological improvements and benefits rise over time due to growth in the
economy and population subject to the externality (gb > 0).  This implies an eventual future preference for
quantity controls based on Equation (17).  As marginal costs fall, the cost savings under price policies
become less important.  Meanwhile, with marginal benefits rising, the stock certainty assured by quantity
policies becomes more important.
Now recall that ∆ t represents the advantage of prices relative to quantities in a single period t.  In
order to consider the relative advantage of fixing these policy instruments over a longer timeframe T—as
in our application to climate change policy below— we simply compute the present value 











∆= + ∆ ∑ .
With policies fixed over longer timeframes and ∆ t  changing over time, the choice of policy
instrument may depend on how long the policy remains in place.  For example, the choice between price
and quantity controls may differ when considering a 5-year versus a 40-year time horizon due to changes
in benefits and costs.  The likely direction of these effects—which we noted tend to favor quantity
controls in the future—implies that shorter-term policies could favor price controls while longer-term
policies would favor quantities.
Although our focus at this point is on quadratic benefits that rise geometrically over time, we can
use Equation (15) to understand the potential effects of more dramatic consequences in the future due, for
example, to thresholds beyond which stock consequences greatly increase.  In the case of climate change,
the possibility of melting polar ice caps followed by significant sea level rise is an example of such
catastrophic effects.  This situation can be captured by a large increase in  tu b + , the slope of marginal
benefits in the future.  Ceteris paribus, such an increase will tilt the balance toward quantity controls by
raising the benefit loss (from Equation (15)) and lowering  t ∆  (from Equation (17)).  However, this effect
will be diminished if it occurs in the future.  Equation (15) indicates that the benefit losses in some future
period  tu +  from using prices in the current period t depends not only on the increased severity of
damages in the future ( tu b + ), but also on the amount of time that will pass before the threshold is reached
(u periods).
This distance in time matters for two reasons: decay and discounting.  Greater decay of price-
induced shocks to the stock will lessen the effect of current policy on future benefits, and greaterResources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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discounting will lessen the value of these future benefits.  Therefore, the further we are from the
threshold, the greater is the mitigating effect of stock decay and discounting.  Just as our plausible growth
assumptions (gc < 0 and gb > 0) suggest the use of a near-term price policy coupled with a quantity control
in the future, the presence of stock thresholds may suggest a similar strategy.  That is, provided the
thresholds remain significantly beyond our initial planning horizon T in Equation (18).  In contrast, a
more imminent threshold would tend to demand quantity controls now.
E. Application to Climate Change Policy
We now apply the above modeling results to the case of regulating the stock of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere in order to mitigate the externality of global climate change.  Table 1 presents the
benchmark values we used for this application, based on currently available information.  The rationale
and data sources for these values are described in detail in part B of the appendix.  In addition to the
parameters discussed so far, we introduce gq and gc to represent constant geometric growth rates for  t q
and ct, respectively.
TABLE 1—INFORMATION FOR ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
Parameter Annualized value
Decay rate of stock (δ ) 0.83%
Discount rate (r) 5.0%
Marginal benefit slope (b0) 8.7 x 10
-13 $/ton
2
Marginal cost slope (c0) 1.6 x 10
-7 $/ton
2
Cost uncertainty (σ 0) 13 $/ton
Cost correlation (ρ ) 0.80
Benefit growth rate (gb) 2.5%
Cost growth rate (gc+gq) –1.0%
Baseline emissions growth rate (gq) 1.5%
Initial stock ( 0 S ) 1.7 x 10
11 tons
Initial emissions ( 0 q ) 5.0 x 10
9 tons
Note: $ refers to 1998 US dollars and tons refers to metric tons of carbon.  See
part B of the appendix for detail on data sources for parameter values.
Using Equations (17) and (18) it is straightforward to compute 
T ∆  for various policy horizons.
With a single period horizon, for example,
() ()
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That is, a price instrument used to regulate carbon dioxide emissions generates an expected $520 million
gain relative to a quantity instrument in a single year.  To get a better sense of the relative gain from using
a price policy, we can also find the welfare gain associated with a quantity-based policy and compute the
percentage difference.  To do this, we first numerically compute the optimal deterministic control path by
solving Equation (5).  We then compare the net benefits of this optimized quantity policy over a particular
horizon versus the no-policy alternative.  In the first period, we find a discounted marginal benefit of 9
$/ton (which is comparable to the estimates in Nordhaus (1994a)) and total net discounted benefits of
$225 million.  The price policy therefore offers a welfare improvement equal to 2.3 times the value of a
comparable quantity policy in the first period.  In other words, prices generate over three times the
expected net benefit of quantities in the first period.
Table 2 also shows results for alternative horizons of 5, 10, 20, and 40 years.  The results indicate
that over longer horizons, the price advantage rises for climate change policy.  With a forty-year horizon,
price controls generate $35 billion in higher expected benefits compared to quantity controls, although
this is now “only” an 120 percent improvement over quantities.  In general, we find that prices generate
nearly 5 times the expected welfare gains of quantities, with consequences on the order of many billions
of dollars per year.
TABLE 2—RELATIVE ADVANTAGE OF PRICES OVER QUANTITIES FOR
OPTIMAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
Expected price advantage Benefits required for indifference Policy
horizon $ billions Relative to quantities $/ton
2 Relative to benchmark
1 year 0.52 2.3 6.1 x 10
-9 7,300
5 years 4.6 3.5 1.7 x 10
-9 2,000
10 years 11 3.8  9.8 x 10
-10 1,200
20 years 21 2.7  5.7 x 10
-10 680
40 years 35 1.2  3.0 x 10
-10 360
Note: $ refers to 1998 US dollars.
Given that there is a wide range of options surrounding the benefits of climate change mitigation,
we can also ask how large the slope of marginal benefits would have to be in order for us to be indifferent
between prices and quantities.  We use the notation () 00 crit bc  to denote the ratio of marginal benefit and
cost slopes at which we are indifferent between prices and quantities, conditional on the remaining
parameters.  For the given parameters, this “critical relative slope” defines a relative benefit level above
which quantities are preferred and below which prices are preferred.  In the case of a policy with a single-
period horizon, the critical relative slope is obtained by rearranging Equation (17) when  0 t ∆= ,Resources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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obtaining () () 00 , crit 1 t bc δρ =Ω Ω .  The benefit slope itself is obtained by multiplying () 00 crit bc  by the
estimate of c0 in Table 1.  As shown in Table 2, we find that there would have to be at least a 7,300-fold
increase in the slope of marginal benefits (relative to the benchmark value of b0 in Table 1) in order for
prices and quantities to generate the same expected net benefits over a single year.
With a longer horizon T, we can find solve  0
T ∆=  from Equation (18), obtaining the functional
relationship
(19) () () ( ) 00 00 crit crit ,, , , , bc bc bc T ggr ρδ = ,
where the parameter 
2
0 σ  vanishes since it only scales 
T ∆ .  These values must be computed numerically.
From Table 2, we can see that the benefit condition for indifference is relaxed over longer time horizons,
though it is still quite high.  A 360-fold increase in the slope of marginal benefits relative to costs is
required for indifference between price and quantity controls even over a forty-year horizon.  Thus,
despite the considerable uncertainty surrounding the consequences of global climate change, the
advantage of prices over quantities remains unless the true benefits of carbon mitigation are many orders
of magnitude greater than our best estimate.
IV. Instrument Choice When Benefits Are Not Directly Known
Thus far we have demonstrated that Weitzman’s main finding—that the choice between prices
and quantities depends on the relative slopes of marginal costs and benefits—requires some important
adjustments for growth, decay, discounting, and cost correlation when applied to the case of stock
externalities.  We have shown how one can determine both whether a price or quantity instrument should
be preferred for a particular case and by how much that instrument is preferred.  That is, Equation (17)
gives us both the sign and the magnitude of the relative advantage.  Even given our simplified model,
however, the information requirements for this result may be excessive for many real-world problems.
As suggested above, the slope of the benefit function may be especially hard to pin down given that it
represents the value of an externality, which by definition is not correctly revealed in market prices.
Nonetheless, in this section we demonstrate that even in the absence of direct benefit measures, we can
still say something about efficient instrument choice.
Namely, we establish a link between the efficient choice of policy instrument and the optimal
production level of the stock externality, demonstrating that certain combinations of instrument and
stringency are inconsistent with optimal behavior regardless of the true benefit level.  In the previous
section, we described and calculated the relative slope of marginal benefits required for indifference
between price and quantity policies for climate mitigation, noting that lower benefits favor prices and
higher benefits favor quantities.  We now take this one step further to consider the optimal stock path
associated with this critical relative slope and show that lower mitigation benefits indicate not only aResources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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preference for prices, but also a higher optimal stock level in all periods (and lower initial abatement
levels).  We thereby establish a link between policy instrument and policy stringency.  Stock externalities
that require only gradual action will favor the use of price-based policies.  In contrast, cases that require
stringent near-term response will favor the use of quantity policies.  Thus, there is typically an
inconsistency inherent in stringent price policies or gradual quantity policies for regulating stock
externalities.  We heuristically outline our supporting argument below, leaving a more detailed proof for
the appendix.
Applied to the case of global climate change policy, our parameter estimates (from Table 1)
indicate that quantity controls are unjustified without the complete near-term elimination of carbon
dioxide emissions.  Our sensitivity analysis demonstrates that under more generous assumptions favoring
quantity controls, price policies continue to be preferred unless mitigation benefits are steep enough to
recommend abatement exceeding 40 percent of uncontrolled carbon emissions.  These results are
appropriate for a generic negative stock externality unless the initial stock level is small or there is a large
difference in the growth rates of marginal benefit and marginal cost slopes.
A. Establishing the Link Between Policy Instrument and Stringency
We begin by considering how a change in the benefit parameter b0 will affect the optimal stock
path.  Ignoring growth (so bt = b0), Figure 1 shows how the marginal benefits in a single period,
() 0 tt bS S −− , would be associated with several points along the optimal stock path.  Note that for the case
of a negative externality, movements down the vertical axis indicate negative values of increasing
magnitude.  In order to satisfy the optimality condition (Equation (8)), the present discounted and decayed
value of these marginal benefits must equal marginal costs in period t.Resources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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Under conditions with flatter marginal benefits (due to smaller b0), indicated by the dashed line,
the magnitude of marginal benefits is lower at each of the indicated stock levels.  In order to maintain the
optimality condition (Equation (8)), the stock level and the associated marginal benefit level must change.
In particular, the stock level will need to rise in each period to partially compensate for the fall in b0 and
return marginal benefits toward their earlier levels.  At least initially, this will involve an increase in the
output level, which will lower the magnitude of marginal costs and again help rebalance the optimality
condition.  Flatter marginal benefits thus represent a weakening of the externality, leading to less
aggressive action.  As we show in part C of the appendix, this behavior is formalized by the following
comparative dynamic result:
For a negative stock externality, a lower slope of marginal benefits relative to marginal costs
implies a higher stock level in every period and a higher output level in the first period.  This
establishes a link between optimal policy stringency and instrument choice since a lower slope
ratio also makes price policies more desirable.  An analogous result holds for positive stock
externalities.
This result is useful because it establishes a link between the choice of optimal policy level and
instrument.  In the previous section, we computed a “critical slope ratio” associated with indifference
between price and quantity controls, below which prices are preferred.  We can now use this critical slope
ratio to compute an associated level of policy stringency, a “critical output level,” indicating optimal
output in the first period based on the critical slope ratio and the remaining parameters.  Relative benefit
slopes below the critical slope ratio are not only consistent with price controls, but imply output levelsResources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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above the critical output level for a negative externality (or lower output levels for a positive externality).
In other words, despite a lack of agreement about the benefits associated with a particular externality, an
unambiguous consistency must remain between a chosen output level and the instrument used to obtain
that output level if the policy is to be optimal given the remaining parameters.
B. Calculating Critical Output Levels Above which Prices are Preferred
To compute this critical output level, we use the critical relative slope (Equation (19)), along with
the remaining parameters, to solve the dynamic optimization given by Equation (5).  Although the general
problem does not have an analytic solution, we can write the functional relationship for the optimal first-
period output level 
*




               ? ? 
,, , , , , bcq qq qqSqbcgggr δ
−−− + +
= ,
where we have simplified for the case of a negative externality ( 0 t S = ) and expressed benefits and costs,
as well as the initial stock and flow, in relative terms.  The use of relative measures follows from: (i) our
ability to re-scale benefits and costs by the cost parameter  0 c  without affecting the solution to Equation
(5); and (ii) the recognition that both flow and stock variables in the optimality condition (Equation (8))
and the accumulation equation (3) can be scaled by an arbitrary constant. We scale the stock and flow by
1 1 q , which allows us to focus on the optimal emission level of the negative externality as well as the
initial stock level, both relative to uncontrolled emissions.  The direction of the effect of the remaining
parameters on 
*
11 qq  are shown above Equation (20) based on derivations given in part D of the
appendix.  Substituting, Equation (19) into Equation (20), we have
(21)
() ( ) ( )
()
**
11 11 01 00 crit crit
*
11 01 crit
                    ? ?
,, , , , , , , , , ,
???? ?
,,, , , ,,
bc bcq
bcq











where the signed effects on () 00 crit bc  are given in part D of the appendix.
Equation (21) allows us to compute a critical output level ()
*
11 crit qq  for a given set of
parameters {} 01 ,,, , , ,, bcq SqT gggr ρδ .  Relative slopes below the critical slope ratio indicate both a
preference for prices as well as an optimal output level higher than this ()
*
11 crit qq .  Similarly, relative




11 crit qq .  In other words, the critical output level defines a threshold for optimal policy
stringency consistent with use of quantity controls.  In the case of a negative externality, if the optimal
level of output is greater than the threshold, it reveals marginal benefits flat enough to generate a positive
comparative advantage, implying price controls are preferred.
C.  Application to Climate Change Policy
In the case of climate change, we can use the benchmark parameter estimates from Table 1 to
compute both () 00 crit bc  and ()
*
11 crit qq .  We focus on a horizon of 20 years since it is likely that a
climate change policy chosen today could be revised within that time if circumstances warrant.  Based on
Equation (21), and using our benchmark parameter estimates for climate change, we find ()
*
11 crit qq = 0.
That is, unless we consider policies to completely eliminate near-term carbon dioxide emissions, our
revealed beliefs about costs and benefits are inconsistent with the use of quantity controls.  Based on the
signed effect of T in Equation (21), a horizon of less than 20 years would only lower the critical output
level and strengthen this result.  The next section shows that while the quantitative result ()
*
11 crit qq = 0 is
sensitive to certain assumptions, particularly concerning the natural stock level and benefit/cost growth,
the qualitative result that less aggressive abatement policies go hand-in-hand with price controls is
remarkably robust.
D.  Sensitivity Analysis and the General Case of a Negative Stock Externality
A lack of direct knowledge and disagreement about mitigation benefits and the parameter  0 b
motivated our focus on the link between the optimal control rate and the choice of instrument.  Of course,
other parameters describing future growth rates, cost correlation, the discount rate, and even the decay
rate may not be precisely known or agreed upon.  It turns out that our results about the critical output
level can be generalized even when many of these remaining parameters are uncertain.  In particular, we
can characterize conservative critical output levels using a small number of parameters.  By conservative,
we mean that the critical output level will be as high as possible for a negative externality, shrinking the
region where optimal output exceeds the critical level and where prices are revealed to be preferred.  We
consider this conservative because despite our attempts to shrink this region, price controls continue to be
preferred in cases that would typically be identified as “stock” externalities.
As described further in part B of the appendix and summarized in Table 3, we begin this
characterization by establishing reasonable value ranges for the remaining parameters.  We then either fix
each parameter at the most conservative value based on the derivative signs established in Equation (21)Resources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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or consider a grid of discrete values for the parameter.  We exclude certain combinations of parameters
that represent unrealistic cases.  The result is 29,196 parameter combinations or “scenarios” for which we
first solve for the critical ratio () 00 crit bc  associated with indifference between prices and quantities (as in
Table 2), then use this critical ratio to compute an optimal control path over a 200-year horizon.
TABLE 3—PARAMETER VALUES FOR COMPUTING CRITICAL OUTPUT LEVELS
ABOVE WHICH PRICES ARE PREFERRED
Parameter Value(s)
Initial stock level ( 01 Sq ) 0, 10, 20, 40
Time horizon (T ) 20 years
Baseline output growth rate ( q g ) 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5%
Cost growth rate ( cq gg + ) –5, –4, –3, –2, –1, 0%
Benefit growth rate ( b g ) 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5%
Discount rate (r ) 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7%
Decay rate of stock (δ ) 0-100%
Correlation of cost shocks ( ρ ) 1
Note: See part B of the appendix for detail on the rationale for parameter value
ranges and restrictions imposed on parameter combinations.
Figure 2 shows the resulting critical output levels in the first period, ()
*
11 crit qq , plotted against
the rate of divergence between benefit and cost growth  bc gg − .  Downward movements along the
vertical axis represent lower output levels and therefore increasingly stringent controls (higher
abatement).  The figure displays curves representing the upper envelope of the critical output estimates,
revealing the value of optimal output levels above which only prices remain efficient for all parameter
combinations.  Thus, output levels above the curves are consistent only with the use of price policies,
while output levels below the curves may or may not be consistent with the use of prices given our
conservative approach.  We indicate four different loci of critical output levels differentiated by the initial
stock/flow ratios  01 Sq  with  0120 Sq =  highlighted by the use of a solid rather than dashed line.  We
emphasize the case where  0120 Sq =  because the idea of a large accumulated stock relative to small
annual flow is, it would seem, the most natural characterization of a stock externality—whether it is
climate change, hazardous waste, national defense, or knowledge.  For example,  0034 Sq ≈  for
atmospheric carbon (see Table 1).  The figure also shows the specific point corresponding to the climate
change parameters given in Table 1.Resources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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FIGURE 2—CRITICAL OUTPUT LEVELS ABOVE WHICH PRICES ARE PREFERRED
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Note: For a given stock/flow ratio (
01 Sq ), areas above each curve designate control levels
that are consistent with the use of prices and are inconsistent with the use of quantities.
Based on the benchmark climate change parameters given in Table 1, the figure illustrates that
only policies involving the complete near-term elimination of emissions are consistent with the use of
quantity instruments.  More generally, if the initial stock/flow ratio is 20 or greater and  bc gg −  is below
10 percent, the figure tells us that only policies involving 40 percent or greater rates of abatement are
potentially consistent with the use of quantity policies.  Since a large accumulated stock is the typical
characterization of a stock externality and benefit/cost growth rates are limited in the long run by
economic growth, this is not only a robust result for climate change, but a general result for most stock
externalities.  This result is limited only by cases of high growth or low initial stock levels.
This result clarifies the intuition indirectly suggested by earlier authors such as Nordhaus (1994),
Kolstad (1996), Pizer (1997), and McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998).  Intuitively, that work suggests that as
long as the existing stock is large relative to the annual flow, marginal benefits will tend to look very flat
over the range of annual emissions since the reductions that could be taken in a given year will never be
enough to significantly alter the stock.  Based on Weitzman (1974), this generic characteristic of what it
means to be a stock externality weighs heavily in favor of price instruments for their control.  Figure 2
shows that this is generally true for carbon mitigation and other pollution stocks unless: (i) marginal
benefits are high enough to warrant 100 percent abatement, suggesting that benefits are indeed steep; orResources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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(ii) the benefit/cost slope ratio is rapidly diverging, so that a relatively low and flat marginal benefit
schedule today may become a high and steep schedule in the near future.
Turning to the figure in more detail, there is an intuitive relationship between the critical output
level and the two parameters shown in Figure 2,  01 Sq  and  bc gg − .  For any parameterization, a low
initial stock level  01 Sq  provides some ability to delay action until the stock accumulates to significant
levels.  When  01 Sq  is large, this flexibility does not exist.  Therefore, high initial stock levels imply that
optimal policy will move more quickly towards stock stabilization and higher abatement levels.
The rate of divergence between benefits and costs  bc gg −  has a very different effect.  As shown
in part D of the appendix, we know that both faster benefit growth and slower cost growth will lower the
critical benefit slope, tending to favor quantities.  Intuitively, increasing values of  bc gg −  distinguish
cases where, over twenty years, we are indifferent between prices and quantity controls in each year
versus cases where we are indifferent overall, even though prices are better in the initial years and
quantity controls are better towards the end.  In the latter case, with higher benefit growth and lower
initial benefits, the optimal initial abatement will be lower (and emissions higher) in advance of the future
rise in mitigation benefits and fall in abatement costs.  Hence, we see a positive relation between benefit-
cost divergence on the horizontal axis and optimal initial emissions on the vertical axis.
V. Conclusions
Our results extend to the case of stock externalities seminal work by Weitzman distinguishing
between otherwise equivalent price and quantity controls when uncertainty exists about control costs.  His
original conclusion, that price mechanisms are more efficient when marginal benefits are relatively flat
and quantity mechanisms are more efficient when benefits are relatively steep, carries over to the case of
stock externalities considered in this paper.  Flatter benefits continue to favor price controls, but the story
is complicated in several ways.  It is no longer a simple relative slopes argument.  The slope of the cost
curve must instead be compared to an adjusted measure of marginal benefit, which takes into account
growth, discounting, depreciation, and correlation of cost shocks. In addition to the obvious application to
stock pollutants, these results could usefully be applied to issues of species preservation, land-use policy,
education, research, highways, and national defense as areas where policymakers wish to regulate a stock-
like externality.
Beyond characterizing the relative advantage of price controls for a stock externality, we further
extend the Weitzman results by linking the choice of instrument and policy stringency. This result is
especially useful when there is disagreement about benefits, since it can be used to restrict the set of
efficient policies even in such cases.  In particular, we demonstrate that quantity-based instruments can
only be associated with more aggressive controls, that is, high abatement levels for a stock pollutant.  ForResources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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this kind of negative stock externality, we characterize a critical output level above which the optimally
chosen output level reveals beliefs are consistent with price controls and inconsistent with quantity
controls.  We show that only when the existing stock level is relatively small and the rate of future
divergence between benefits and costs is quite large, can quantity controls be consistent with levels of
abatement below 40 percent.  Otherwise, price controls are preferred.  While our choice of parameter
values is motivated by the example of climate change and carbon dioxide emission reductions, we believe
these results are applicable to a wide range of market failures involving negative stock externalities.
This confirms earlier intuition with two caveats:  As long as the existing stock is large relative to
the annual flow, it has been argued that marginal benefits will tend to look very flat over the range of
annual emissions, since the reductions that could be taken in a given year will never be enough to
significantly alter the stock.  Based on Weitzman’s relative slope argument, this generic characteristic of
what it means to be a stock externality weighs heavily in favor of price instruments for their control.   Our
results demonstrate that this is true unless marginal benefits are high enough to warrant high abatement
levels in the immediate future, or if benefits grow rapidly relative to costs.
Regarding climate change, these results have important implications for the recently negotiated
Kyoto Protocol.  First, application of our relative advantage expression finds that price instruments for
carbon reduction generate up to five times the expected welfare gains of quantity instruments, depending
on the policy horizon.  Yet, the Kyoto Protocol requires binding, quantity-based reductions.  Second, the
Kyoto Protocol mandates average reductions of 4 percent below 1990 levels for industrialized countries,
or about a 10 percent reduction below 2010 projected baseline levels (Energy Information Administration
1998).  This represents only a 5½ percent decline in global flows into the atmospheric stock of carbon
since Kyoto does not limit emissions from non-industrialized countries—which will soon comprise about
half of global emissions.  The Kyoto mandates are therefore well below even our conservative estimate of
the reductions necessary (40%) to justify the use of quantity policies in efficiency terms.  Kyoto thus
embodies an economic inconsistency between targets and instruments.
What does this tell us?  If we believe the Kyoto Protocol reveals a balance between costs and
benefits, it tells us that the Kyoto goals should be treated as “targets” to be achieved through policies that
include flexible price-based elements rather than rigid quantity mandates.  On the other hand, if we
believe that the threat of climate change demands rigid quantity controls, the limited reductions associated
with Kyoto are wholly inadequate.  One might argue that the Kyoto Protocol should be viewed as a
delicate balance among many competing factors, some economic and some geo-political.  Perhaps so.
But at a minimum, our analysis suggests that the cost of this economic sacrifice is on the order of many
billions of dollars and should not be made lightly.Resources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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Appendix
A. Details on Correlation Factor
We introduce the correlation factor  ,t ρ Ω  to capture the potential correlation between
current and previous period shocks to the stock level, which will increase benefit losses under a
price policy.  Here we derive an analytic expression for  ,t ρ Ω  and establish the sign of various
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Equation (22) can be summed to create the expression
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.  Taking the derivative of  ,t ρ Ω
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The inequality follows from: (i) the fact that  () ( )
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B. Data for Climate Policy Application and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we describe the rationale and sources for the values we used for our
application to climate policy and general sensitivity analyses, as presented in Tables 2 and 3.  All
monetary values are denominated in 1998 US dollars, if necessary adjusted using the price index
for gross domestic product (Council of Economic Advisors 1999).
Uncontrolled Output ( 0 q ), Output Growth ( q g ) and Initial Stock Level ( 0 S) .   The pre-
industrial concentration of carbon in the atmosphere is 6.13 x 10
11 tons from Neftel et al (1999),
converted from 288 ppm to metric tons using a conversion rate of 2.13 x 10
9 tons/ppm.  TheResources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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concentration of carbon in 1998 is 367 ppm or 7.81 x 10
11 tons from Keeling and Whorf (1999).
Since we measure the stock relative to its benefit-maximizing level, our initial stock level
( 0 S =1.7 x 10
11 tons) is found by taking the difference between these two values.  Initial (1998)
global carbon emissions ( 0 q =5.0 x 10
9 tons) are based on 6.52 x 10
9 tons of emissions from
fossil-fuel burning, cement manufacture, and gas flaring in 1996 (Marland et al 1999), plus 1.25
x 10
9 tons of emissions from land use changes (e.g., deforestation) (Kattenberg et al 1996).  Total
carbon emissions of 7.77 x 10
9 tons are then adjusted by multiplying by 0.64 to account for
short-run decay (Nordhaus 1994a).  This yields an initial stock/output ratio ( 00 Sq ) of 34.  For
sensitivity analysis, we consider initial stock/output ratios between zero and forty.
The growth rate of baseline carbon emissions (gq=1.5%) is based on our estimate of the
rate of emissions growth over the 25 years 1972–1996 using the data and model described below
in the paragraph on cost uncertainty.  It is equal to the average 1.5% rate used in IPCC scenario
IS92a over the period 2000–2020 (Kattenberg et al 1996).  For sensitivity analysis we consider
rates of output growth ranging from 0% to 5%.  This range was determined by the assumption
that output growth is limited in the long run by economic growth, which seems unlikely to
exceed 5%.
Initial Benefits ( 0 b ), Costs ( 0 c ), and Growth ( b g,   c g ).  The initial value for the marginal
benefit slope (b0=8.7 x 10
-13 $/ton
2) is based on Nordhaus’ (1994b) survey of climate experts as
reported in Roughgarden and Schneider (1999).  The survey asked respondents to estimate the
loss associated with 3°C warming, producing answers that ranged from zero to a 21% loss of
gross world product (GWP).  We use the median response of a 1.85% loss in our analysis.  We
associate 3°C warming with a 1.12 x 10
12 ton increase over pre-industrial carbon concentrations,
based on the assumptions that a doubling of carbon concentrations leads to a 2°C warming and
that temperature change is proportional to the change in the log of the carbon stock (Kattenberg
et al 1996).  In order to convert the fractional loss of GWP to dollars, we multiply by the $29.5
trillion IMF estimate of 1998 GWP (International Monetary Fund 1998).  This gives us $546
billion in damages from 1.12 x 10
12 tons of carbon which, applied to the benefit relation
(Equation (1)), generates our estimate of b0.  This estimate leads to an initial marginal benefit of
abatement of roughly $9/ton (discounted and depreciated), which is comparable to earlier work
by Falk and Mendelsohn (1993) and Nordhaus (1994a).Resources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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The initial value for the marginal cost slope (c0=1.6 x 10
-7 $/ton
2) is based on results from
10 models that participated in the Energy Modeling Forum’s EMF 16, as reported by Weyant
and Hill (1999).  For each model, we considered a 10% emission reduction.  We divided the
estimated marginal cost by 0.64 to account for short-run emissions decay, converting from
dollars per ton of emitted carbon to dollars per ton of carbon retained in the atmosphere.
Second, we computed a marginal cost slope for each model by dividing the adjusted marginal
costs by 5.0 x 10
8 tons, which is 10% of our estimate of initial retained emissions ( 0 q ).  We used
the mean value of these slopes as our estimate of c0.  Although this estimate is several times
higher than those reported in Falk and Mendelsohn (1993) and Nordhaus (1994a), it reflects
more recent modeling results suggesting less elasticity in carbon demand.
The benefit growth rate (gb=2.5%) is the annualized growth rate in GWP for 2000–2050
from Leggett et al (1992) for the central IPCC scenario IS92a.  This value captures benefit
growth due to both population and income per capita.  For sensitivity analysis we allow gb to
range from 0% to 5%.  As with output, this is based on the assumption that benefit growth is
limited by economic growth and that 5% is a reasonable upper bound.
The cost growth rate (gq+gc=-1.0%) represents our assumed rate of change in the
marginal cost associated with a fixed fractional reduction in emissions.  (Note that gc alone
indicates the rate of change in marginal costs associated with the first ton of abatement,
regardless of the uncontrolled emission level.)  There is limited information in the literature upon
which to base this parameter; we have chosen it to equal the average rate of change in marginal
costs for the 10 EMF models.  As a measure of technological change, we allow gq+gc to take on
values ranging from 0% to –5% in our sensitivity analysis.
Cost uncertainty ( 0 σ ) and Correlation (ρ ).  Cost uncertainty (σ 0=13 $/ton) is the sum of
uncertainty in the cost function itself and uncertainty in baseline emissions.  Our estimate of
uncertainty in the cost function itself (6 $/ton) is the standard error of the adjusted marginal cost
of a 1.1% emission reduction from the 10 EMF models, as described above.  Reductions of 1.1%
are optimal in the first period for the deterministic optimal control problem in Equation (5) based
on the preceding parameter values.  Our estimate of uncertainty in baseline emissions is from a
first-order autoregressive maximum-likelihood model of global carbon emissions over the 25
year period 1972–1996 using data from Marland et al (1999).  We estimated the model
exp( ) tq t qg t α µ =+ ,Resources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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where  t q  is the historic uncontrolled emission level,  1 tt t µρ µ ν − =+  and  t ν  is iid.  The estimated
standard error of  t ν  was 1.1 x 10
8 tons and the estimate of ρ  was 0.66.  We converted the
emissions uncertainty into cost uncertainty by multiplying by 0.64 (to adjust for short-run decay)
and then by our estimated slope of marginal costs; the result was 11 $/ton.  We computed total
cost uncertainty (13 $/ton) by summing the variances of its two underlying components.
If we use the same approach to measure cost uncertainty after twenty periods, when
optimal reductions are 2.7%, we find that the 10 EMF models generate a standard error of 15
$/ton (due to divergence of the models at higher reduction levels) while correlation of
uncontrolled emissions shocks generates an error of 15 $/ton.  Summing the variances we find a
total cost error of 21 $/ton after 20 years which, beginning with cost shocks of 13 $/ton in year
one, would occur if the overall correlation were 0.80, our choice for ρ .  That is, we choose ρ  to
match the estimated cost errors in year one and year twenty.
Decay (δ ) and Discounting (r ).  The decay rate of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
(δ =0.83%) is from Nordhaus (1994a).  For our sensitivity analyses, we allow δ  to vary between
0 and  00 qS , since a decay rate of δ can lead to a stock/flow ratio of at most 1 δ . We use a
discount rate of r  = 5% based on the central value from Pizer (1997).  For our sensitivity
analysis, we considered a recent review of discount rates used by policymakers (Bazelon and
Smetters 1999) and use the range 2% to 7%.
Approach for Sensitivity Analysis.  For our sensitivity analysis, we set ρ =1 so that the
critical output level will be as high as possible for a negative externality, thereby being biased in
favor of quantity controls.  We establish reasonable value ranges for the remaining parameters,
as described above, and for each parameter we consider six evenly spaced values, except  01 Sq
where we consider four exponentially spaced values (i.e., 0, 10, 20, and 40).  We then consider
all possible combinations of these parameter values, thereby generating an initial set of
466666 3 1 , 1 0 4 ×××××=  different parameter combinations or stock externality “scenarios”.
In addition to establishing reasonable ranges for individual parameters, however, it is also
important consider the implications of certain parameter combinations.  In particular, we restrict
our attention to cases where  2 0 b rg δ +−>  for the following reason.  We know from Equation










 (or, approximately,  2 0 b rg δ +−≤ ) implies quantities will beResources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
31
preferred for any non-zero value of  0 b  and therefore ()
*
11 crit 1 qq = .  Intuitively, the concavity of
benefits is growing at a sufficiently fast rate to cause any price-induced variation in the stock
level to have infinitely negative consequences—even allowing for discounting and decay.
We exclude these combinations as representing unusual, unrealistic cases both because (i)
they imply that the long-run stock should be zero (lim 0 tt S →∞ = ) and (ii) they suggest a negative
rate of pure time preference.  First,  2 0 b rg δ +−≤  implies  b rg ≤  and therefore that the present













+  −  + 
is minus infinity.  This means that the optimal long-run stock level is zero—a very unusual case
that renders the problem uninteresting.  In the case of climate change, for example, there are
frequent discussions of stabilizing atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations at a level of 450
ppm or higher, but rarely trying to return concentrations to their pre-industrialization (and
presumably harmless) level of 288 ppm.
Second, the discount rate can be decomposed into components associated with the pure
rate of time preference and with productivity growth (Arrow et al 1996):
(23) () ( ) pure time preference productivity growth r τ =+
where τ  measures the curvature of a constant relative risk aversion utility function; empirically
τ  is usually greater than one.  To the extent that benefit growth is limited by productivity
growth, so  () productivity growth b g < , Equation (23) implies  b rg > .  This is inconsistent with
the possibility that  2 0 b rg δ +−≤ .  For both of these reasons, we focus our attention on the
29,196 cases where  2 0 b rg δ +−> .  Based on our use of evenly-spaced parameter values, this
actually implies  2 1% b rg δ +−>  which, from the decomposition in Equation (23), implies a
pure rate of time preference of at least 1%.
C. Establishing the Link Between Policy Instrument and Stringency
We construct a proof by contradiction of the comparative dynamic result by showing that
if the stock were to not decrease in response to an increase in the marginal benefits slope (for a
negative externality), this would lead to a violation of the conditions for optimality.  Therefore
our result holds: that steeper benefits imply lower initial output of a negative stock externalityResources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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and increased output of a positive stock externality and the reverse for flatter benefits.  We begin
with an optimal production and stock path, 
*
t q  and 
*
t S , for a particular path of cost and benefit
parameters, ct and bt, as well as the cost minimizing and benefit maximizing production and
stock levels,  t q  and  t S , respectively.  We focus on the case of a bad, where  tt SS >  and  tt qq > ;
the proof proceeds analogously with the inequalities reversed for a good.
Consider an alternative set of steeper benefit parameters  ˆ
tt bb > .  We begin with the
supposition (later shown to be false) that along the new optimal path, 
* ˆt q  and 
* ˆ
t S , there exists a
period  ˆ t  where the stock path associated with steeper benefits is not decreasing relative to the
baseline stock path (i.e., 
**
ˆˆ 11 ˆ
tt SS −− ≤  and 
**
ˆˆ ˆ




tt qq ≥ .  Rearranging the Euler equation (7), we have
(24) () () () 11 1
1
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which implies that 
**
ˆˆ 11 ˆ
tt qq ++ > .  Recursively applying this technique implies 
** ˆtt qq >  and 
** ˆ
tt SS >
for all  ˆ tt > .
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For a bad, where  tt SS > , these results ( ˆ
tt bb > , 
** ˆ
tt SS > , and 
** ˆtt qq >  for all  ˆ tt > ) imply that after
period  ˆ t , the right side of Equation (25) unambiguously decreases and the left side increases.
Therefore, our original supposition—that there exists a period  ˆ t  when the stock path associated
with steeper benefits is not decreasing relative to the original stock path—is false.  Since
**
00 ˆ SS = , this implies that with steeper benefits it must be the case that the optimal stock level
falls for all  0 t >  (
** ˆ
tt SS < ) and 
**
11 ˆ qq <  for a negative externality.
D. Signing the Derivatives of () 00 crit bc  and 
*
11 qq
We first compute the derivatives of () 00 crit bc  with respect to different arguments, finding
the following:Resources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
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() () ( ) 00 00 crit crit
     
,, , , , bc bc bc T ggr ρδ
−−−+++
= ,
where signs above parameters give the direction of effects.  We sign these effects by applying
the implicit function theorem to  () ()
2
00 00 crit ,, , , ,,, ,
T
bc Tc b c g g r σρ δ ∆= ∆ .  From Equation (17)















































In several situations, we will appeal to the fact that whenever  0
T ∆=  there always exists
a period  ˆ tT <  where  0 t ∆≥  for  ˆ tt ≤  and  0 t ∆<  for  ˆ tt > .  This is true because we assume
0 bc gg ≥≥  (see data section) and  ,1 , tt ρρ + Ω≥ Ω  (from our discussion of  ,t ρ Ω ).  Therefore,
,1 1 , 1 tt tt t t cb c b δρ δρ −− − −Ω Ω < − Ω Ω .  Based on the existence of  ˆ t ,  () ( ) 10
t
t tTft r
≤ ∆+ < ∑  for any
monotonically increasing non-negative function  () f ⋅ , since it places greater weight on the
values of   0 t ∆<  when  ˆ tt > .
We now consider the effect of each of the arguments of () 00 crit bc  in turn.
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where the inequality follows because 
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positive and monotonically increasing over t, we know the first term is negative.  From Equation
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where the inequality follows from the fact that the second and third terms are both positive and
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b g .  From Equation (26) we have
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r .  From Equation (26) we have
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We now consider the derivatives of 
*




11 1 1 0 1 0 0
      ? ?
,, , , , , bcq qq q q S q b c g g g r δ
−− − + +
=⋅ .Resources for the Future                                                                                               Newell and Pizer
36
We do not have an analytic expression for 
*
1 q  because it is the solution to an optimal control
problem with time-varying parameters.  However, we can use the Euler equation (24) to establish
the sign of several derivatives using proofs by contradiction similar to the one presented in
section C.
0 S .  Suppose  00 SS > "  and in response 
**
11 qq ≥ "  where tildes indicate an alternative
parameterization and solution.  The left side of the Euler equation (24) becomes more positive
and the right side more negative.  In response, 
**
22 qq > " , and from the accumulation equation
()
*
10 1 0 1 SS q S δ =− + > "" " .  Applying this argument iteratively, we find 
**
tt qq > "  and  tt SS > "  for all t
(except 
**
11 qq ≥ " ).  But this violates Equation (25), where the left side is more positive and the
right more negative.  Therefore 
**























b g .  Suppose  bb gg > "  and in response 
**
11 qq ≥ "  where tildes indicate an alternative
parameterization and solution.  Using the same argument given for the effect of  0 S , this leads to
a violation of the conditions for optimality.  Therefore 
**










c g  and  q g .  These parameters cannot be signed since they affect both sides of the Euler
equation in the same way.
r .  Suppose rr > "  and in response 
**
11 qq ≤ "  where tildes indicate an alternative
parameterization and solution.  Using the same line of argument given for the effect of  0 S , this
leads to a violation of the conditions for optimality.  Therefore 
**









δ .  Suppose δδ > "  and in response 
**
11 qq ≤ "  where tildes indicate an alternative
parameterization and solution.  Using the same argument given for the effect of  0 S , this leads to
a violation of the conditions for optimality.  Therefore 
**
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